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David Feller, Senior Partner 
Michael Gottesmant 
I. 
DAVE FELLER, LAWYER-SCHOLAR 
While in law school, in the late 1950's, I decided that I wanted a career 
in labor law, representing unions. I asked my labor law professor what 
firms I should consider. He told me there was one firm nationwide that 
stood out from all the rest: Goldberg, Feller and Bredhoff. He warned, 
though, that the firm was very small, and the chances of getting a job there 
remote. I did some research and discovered that the firm had only four 
lawyers: three partners (Arthur Goldberg, Dave Feller, and Elliot Bredhoft), 
and one associate (Jerry Anker). The firm was General Counsel to one of 
America's largest unions, United Steelworkers of America (which at that 
time had 1.3 million members). It was also General Counsel to the 
Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO (the continued embodiment 
of the CIO after its merger with the AFL). When I applied to the firm, I 
received a polite letter advising that the firm was not hiring, and I shuffled 
off to my second-choice, the Department of Justice. 
Two years later, John Kennedy was elected President, and chose 
Arthur Goldberg to be Secretary of Labor. The firm, bereft of its senior 
partner, but still General Counsel of the Steelworkers and IUD, announced 
that it was looking for a new associate. I pounced. 
My job interview began inauspiciously: I was ten minutes late. I 
explained that I had been unable to find the entrance to the building. l Dave 
Feller asked caustically whether I anticipated similar difficulties finding my 
way into courthouses. I did not think this a good sign, and nothing else 
about the interview suggested that I was garnering any favor in that quarter. 
Indeed, as I later learned, another applicant had a more impressive 
academic record, and I strongly suspect that, given Dave's intellectual bent, 
t James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. 
1. The firm's address was 1000 Connecticut Avenue, but I was unable to find an entrance on 
Connecticut Avenue despite diligent search. It was ten minutes before it occurred to me to look around 
the comer, where I found the entrance on K Street. The building owners had reached for a tony 
Connecticut Avenue address, but hadn't thought it necessary to match the doorway to the address. 
265 
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I was not his first choice. But I did get the offer, even on a split decision, 
and that other candidate went off to a career as a renowned environmental 
law scholar at a top-ten law school. 
The firm that I entered had two "senior" partners: Dave Feller, then 44, 
and Elliot Bredhoff, then 39. Both were intimately involved at the policy-
making level in the affairs of the Steelworkers and IUD, and both 
participated in the Steelworkers' negotiations with the steel, aluminum, and 
can manufacturing industries, but beyond that there was a clear division of 
responsibility: Dave was the barrister, Elliot the solicitor. Elliot strove to 
solve problems and avoid lawsuits. Dave relished lawsuits, and saw them 
as an instrument for achieving social change. 
Newly minted lawyers are of little value in negotiating and problem-
solving, so the bulk of my work at the firm was brief-writing under Dave's 
tutelage. Dave did not suffer fools gladly, and my early efforts, I fear, 
confirmed his initial instincts that I was just such. Dave's was not (then at 
least) a gentle pedagogy. If a draft of a brief fell short, Dave was quick to 
point out its deficiencies. My earliest drafts were returned with Dave's 
"suggested" changes. A typical draft had literally everything I had written 
crossed out, with Dave's substitute text handwritten onto every available 
white space on the page. For timid neophytes, this could be terrifying. As I 
was the only neophyte around, it was especially so. 
But it was also remarkably educational. I was "enjoying" a unique 
experience: apprenticing in a four-person law firm with a consummate 
master. Dave was the best appellate advocate I've seen, bar none, in the 
now forty-plus years of my legal career. I learned by osmosis from my 
humbling experiences under Dave's tutelage. In time, whole sentences of 
my draft briefs, and occasionally even paragraphs, survived Dave's 
demanding pen. It's good that they did, for in just a few short years Dave 
was gone to pursue his second career as academic/arbitrator, and I, not yet 
30, was (by default) in charge of the firm's litigation.2 
I've written hundreds of briefs since Dave departed, but in my mind's 
eye, even today, Dave is looking over my shoulder as I draft each of them. 
Each has been written to satisfy Dave's restless pen; if it meets that 
standard, satisfying the judges will be a piece of cake. 
I learned more than just brief-writing under Dave's tutelage. I learned 
a unique method of practicing law. Lawyers who opt to represent unions do 
not have wealth acquisition as their primary goal, but Dave Feller and Elliot 
Bredhoff carried this disinterest to unparalleled heights. They did not solicit 
business for the firm. Rather, they were content to focus on the firm's two 
principal clients, accepting occasional invitations to represent other unions 
2. "Default" is quite literally my claim to the position. With Dave's departure, Jerry Anker 
chose to take his quite considerable talents to a larger firm in DC, and I was the only litigator left. 
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in the Supreme Court (Dave) or in perilous practical circumstances (Elliot). 
This meant that there was ample time to "dig deep" on the matters the firm 
did undertake, and those matters were usually path-breaking. The 
Steelworkers had a very talented staff of in-house lawyers, as well as top-
flight law firms in all the major steel centers, who handled the union's 
bread-and-butter legal work. Our firm litigated only the cases that were of 
exceptional importance to the union--either because they involved breaking 
new legal ground, or because the stakes in practical terms were enormous. 
There was no "routine" litigation. 
Ample time to work on precedent-making litigation yielded a 
remarkable intellectual enterprise. It was not until I came to academia in 
1989 that I found a good analogue to my law firm experience: the faculty 
scholarship workshop. Our litigation team-Dave, Jerry Anker and me-
would meet on virtually a daily basis to review whatever draft brief was in 
the works. A wide ranging discussion would ensue, much of it at high 
levels of legal theory. And the agenda for these explorations was labor law 
writ large, including civil rights, constitutional law, and more. The focus 
was not merely on winning that case, but on shaping the law so that it 
would benefit the labor movement (and hence America!) over the long run. 
We had a mandate from our clients to do this, and thus did not have to 
compromise the long view for immediate tactical victories. Ideas 
percolated that could not be deployed in the case under discussion, but they 
would be "filed away," to be invoked in future cases that came down the 
pipeline--<:ases that we would then be on the lookout to find. 3 
When, in 1967, Dave decided to embark on a second career in 
academia, this seemed a natural transition: his legal practice, after all, had 
been an academic career, too. But, though he was now 3,000 miles away, 
his blueprint for what I now call "faculty workshop lawyering" lived on. 
We maintained, with the new lawyers who came to the firm, the intellectual 
approach to litigation Dave had fostered. Over the years the firm grew a 
bit, but hardly as other DC firms did: we were 22 lawyers when I left, 
twenty years after Dave.We deliberately controlled the volume of work, and 
the size of the firm, so that its unique attributes as a boutique think-tank 
could be preserved.4 
Perhaps the clearest testament to this academic lawyering is the 
3. In 1994, Dave gave his Fireside Chat to the National Academy of Arbitrators, in which he 
described "the unique shop" that "Arthur Goldberg ... ran, of which I was fortunate enough to be a 
part." David E. Feller, How the Trilogy was Made, in ARBITRATION 1994: CONTROVERSY AND 
CONTINUITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 329 (1995). It is possible, as Dave described, that Goldberg gets credit for inventing this 
way of lawyering. But I came after Goldberg had left, and the "unique shop" that I found was a product 
of Dave's academic talents and inclinations. 
4. That tradition has continued to this day. While the other Washington "boutiques" all grew (or 
merged) into much larger firms, Bredhoff & Kaiser has crept just to 30. 
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number of lawyers who, after spending time at this tiny firm, followed 
Dave's example and moved on to academia: Cindy Estlund (to Texas, 
thence Columbia), Deborah Malamud (to Michigan, thence NYU and 
Yale), Jim Brudney (to Ohio State), David Sklansky (to UCLA), Barbara 
Bergman (to New Mexico), Jim Wooten (to Buffalo), Susan Carle (to 
American), Jim Holzhauer (to Chicago), Walter Kamiat (to Georgetown), 
and me (to Georgetown).5 
II. 
DA VE FELLER, LEGAL ARCHITECT 
Dave's principal achievements while at the firm are well-known, so I'll 
describe them only briefly. He played a major role in the CIa's expUlsion 
of communist-dominated unions, in the merger of the AFL and CIa, in the 
Steelworkers' collective bargaining achievements from 1949 through the 
mid-1960's, and, of course, in the development of the law governing the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Dave's successes litigating Supreme Court cases involving the 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements are legendary. I can't 
think of another lawyer who has put his or her stamp on a field of law as 
Dave did on the law governing enforcement of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Dave didn't just win every major foundational Section 301 
case,6 he won with opinions that embraced precisely the analytical lines he 
had put before the Court. And those lines were breathtakingly innovative. 
In Lincoln Mills'? the Court held (1) that Congress, by conferring 
jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits for violations of collective 
bargaining agreements, expected the federal courts to develop a "federal 
common law" of the collective bargaining agreement;8 (2) that the 
touchstone for formulating the federal common law would be the policies 
underlying the federal labor laws (and not state common law of contracts);9 
and (3) that notwithstanding the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against 
federal court injunctions in labor disputes-a provision whose "literal 
reading" would preclude orders enforcing agreements to arbitrate-federal 
courts could enter such orders because "[t]he failure to arbitrate was not a 
5. Holzhauer and Kamiat later returned to practice. The rest of us appear to be in academia for 
keeps. 
6. Section 30 I of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides, in pertinent 
part: "(a) Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be 
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ... " 
7. Textile Workers United v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
8. Id., at 451-57. 
9. Id. at 456 ("federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws"). 
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part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed."lo The first 
of these holdings was unprecedented in the annals of American law, and 
remains so. There is not another federal statute, anywhere in the law, that 
the Court has construed as a mandate to develop an entire body of federal 
common law. 
In the Steelworkers Trilog/ I-three cases that Dave argued 
consecutively over the course of two days12-the Court laid out the 
foundation-stones of the federal common law Lincoln Mills had authorized. 
Labor agreements invariably prescribe arbitration as the forum for resolving 
disputes over the interpretation and application of the agreement. The 
Court's opinions in these three cases established the following principles 
regarding labor arbitration. Courts are not to deny arbitration of a grievance 
arising under a labor agreement because they think the grievant's claim 
frivolousY They are to read agreements to arbitrate broadly, and purported 
exceptions narrowly: "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should 
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."14 And 
once the arbitrator rules, courts have no role in second-guessing the 
correctness of the arbitrator's contract interpretation; they may set aside an 
award only if the arbitrator's decision is avowedly based on his or her "own 
brand of industrial justice" rather than on the agreement of the parties. 15 As 
Enterprise Wheel put it: "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying 
an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded 
his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.,,16 
These decisions do not seem revolutionary today. Forty years of 
consistent application has made them seem commonplace. But at the time, 
they were astonishing, for the judicial attitude then prevailing-manifested 
in Supreme Court decisions involving commercial arbitration-was to 
resolve all doubts against arbitration. To secure this sweeping about-face 
for labor arbitration, Dave persuaded the Court that labor arbitration is 
different in kind from commercial arbitration. The Court embraced Dave's 
thesis in these words: 
10. ld. at 458. 
11. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 563 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
GulfNav. Co., 563 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 563 U.S. 593 
(1960). 
12. In those days, the Court al10wed one hour per side for oral argument in each case, and sat for 
four hours per day. The Trilogy thus was argued over the course of two days. 
13. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 566-68. 
14. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83. 
15. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 
16. ld. at 598. 
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[T]he run of [commercial] arbitration cases [is] irrelevant ... ' There the 
choice is between the adjudication of cases or controversies in courts with 
established procedures or even special statutory safeguards on the one hand 
and the settlement of them in the more informal arbitration on the other. In 
the com. lercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here, 
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor 
disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary 
commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of 
commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes 
is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.17 
Ironically, Dave's success in moving the Court to receptivity for labor 
arbitration had a powerful reverberating impact on commercial arbitration. 
F or, in succeeding years, the Court transported the 30 I jurisprudence that 
Dave had built to the commercial arena as well. Although there was no 
intervening change in the Federal Arbitration AdS-the federal statute that 
regulates commercial arbitration-the Court, citing its labor precedents, 
abandoned its prior hostility to arbitration and erected similar pro-
arbitration presumptions under the FAA, citing the Steelworkers Trilogy.19 
Dave was also the architect of the union's brief in John Wiley & Sons 
v. Livingston,20 in which, once again, he convinced the Court to abandon 
traditional legal rules in its evocation of federal common law. Under 
traditional principles, a company that purchases merely the assets (and not 
the stock) of another company is not bound by the latter's agreements. But 
in Wiley the Court held, as Dave urged, that the rule should be different 
with respect to collective bargaining agreements. The purchaser of assets 
who carries on the same work as the seller is bound to arbitrate disputes 
arising under the seller's collective bargaining agreement, with the 
arbitrator to determine (by construction of the agreement) whether it was 
intended to protect employees' jobs in the event of an asset sale.21 
While at the law firm, Dave did encounter one frustrating experience in 
his Section 301 odyssey. The case was Independent Petroleum Workers v. 
American Oil CO. 22 The union had lost a Section 301 case in the court of 
appeals, and retained Dave to get the decision overturned in the Supreme 
Court. Dave wrote a petition for writ of certiorari that convinced the 
Supreme Court to take the case, and briefed and argued the case on the 
merits with the aplomb that was his trademark. But Justice Goldberg had 
17. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.s. at 578. 
18. 9 U.s.C. § I el seq. 
19. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
20. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
21. ld.at547-51. 
22. 379 U.S. 130 (1964). 
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disqualified himself (presumably because his former partner was arguing 
the case), and the remaining eight Justices divided 4-4. In the Supreme 
Court, a tie vote means that the lower court opinion is affirmed. This was 
Dave's only "loss" in the string of Section 301 cases he handled beginning 
with Lincoln Mills, although one of no lasting precedential significance (4-4 
decisions don't count, except for the unfortunate petitioner in that case). 
And the irony is that there's little doubt how Justice Goldberg would have 
voted had he participated; Dave's position was in line with other decisions 
Justice Goldberg had rendered since joining the Court. 
I recall the threat this decision seemed to pose at the time for Dave's 
career as the labor movement's most prominent and successful Supreme 
Court litigant. His involvement in a case apparently meant the loss of one 
vote on the Court, and the vote of a Justice whose voting record was 
relatively pro-union. From a client's perspective, was it worth losing one 
sympathetic vote on the Supreme Court to have Dave as one's lawyer, 
rather than America's second-best union advocate? The answer might 
rationally be "yes," but Dave was not optimistic potential clients would 
figure that out. 
There are few good things that flowed from Justice Goldberg's 
decision, soon thereafter, to accept President Johnson's invitation to leave 
the Court to become U.N. Ambassador. But the one undeniably good thing 
was that it freed Dave from this bizarre dilemma. And, shortly after Justice 
Fortas was appointed to replace the departed Justice Goldberg, Dave was 
retained by the union officials who had lost below in Vaca v. Sipes.23 Thus 
was ~pe last brick installed in the Section 301 house that Dave built. 
In Vaca, the Court, again adopting arguments advanced by Dave, 
issued rulings as innovative as those in Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers 
Trilogy, and Wiley v. Livingston. The Missouri courts had allowed a jury to 
find a union liable in negligence for failing to take a meritorious grievance 
to arbitration. Dave persuaded the Court to hold that (1) federal law is the 
exclusive measure of the duty owed by a union to the employees it 
represents (thus preempting all state law, including states' traditional 
negligence law);24 (2) the duty imposed by federal law-the duty of fair 
representation-is not breached by a union's negligence, but only "when a 
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith;"25 and (3) an employee whose 
grievance is not taken to arbitration by the union cannot sue the employer 
for breach of contract without first establishing that the union's failure 
23. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
24. !d. at 177, 188-89. 
25. Id. at 190. 
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constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation.26 The second of these 
holdings is especially remarkable. So far as I know, unions are the only 
private institution in America not held to a duty of reasonable care to those 
they represent. 
It's been four decades since these landmark decisions, and the Court 
has not deviated one iota from the principles established in these cases. 
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed them. 27 Of course, Dave didn't 
leave that to chance: although now in academia, Dave kept a finger on the 
scales, authoring amicus briefs for the National Academy of Arbitrators in 
many of the important succeeding Section 301 cases.28 He had made the 
law, and he saw that it stayed made. 
Dave was busily at work on this agenda until the very end, authoring 
four powerful Supreme Court briefs for the Academy after he turned 80.29 
He was especially pleased with his success as octagenarian advocate in 
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,30 for he added yet another 
wrinkle to the body of Section 301 law. In that case, the Fourth Circuit had 
held that an employee could not bring a lawsuit against his employer for 
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, because his union had agreed 
in the collective bargaining agreement that all "matters under dispute," if 
not resolved by discussion, would be submitted to arbitration. The parties' 
principal focus in the Supreme Court was on the question whether a union's 
power as exclusive bargaining agent extended so far as to oust employees 
of their right to bring lawsuits under external law. Dave, however, saw the 
case as an opportunity to achieve a goal for which he had long advocated-
confining labor arbitration to the resolution of disputes over the 
interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements, and 
excluding from labor arbitration disputes arising under external law. 
In his scholarship, Dave had been a consistent advocate that the pro-
arbitration principles adopted, at his urging, in the Trilogy were meant to 
apply only to contractual issues, not legal issues; indeed, he believed it was 
undesirable for labor arbitrators to mess with external law. 31 But in 
26. ld. at 186. 
27. The principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy have been reaffinned in, inter alia, A. T. & T. 
Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. 
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMW Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Major 
League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001). The principles of Vaca v. Sipes have 
been reaffinned in, inter alia, United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991). 
28. He authored amicus curiae briefs for the Academy in A. T. & T. Technologies, 475 U.s. 643; 
Misco, 484 U.S. 29; and the cases cited infra note 29. 
29. The briefs were in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), described 
infra note 30 and accompanying text; E. Associated Coal, 531 U.S. 57; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); and Garvey, 532 U.S. 504. 
30. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
31. Among the articles in which he expressed this view were David E. Feller, The Impact of 
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intervening years the Court, in commercial arbitration cases arising under 
the FAA, had extended the presumption of arbitrability to external law 
issues. 32 While the parties' briefs in Wright vigorously debated whether 
unions had power to deprive employees of their lawsuits under external 
law, Dave's amicus brief suggested the Court need not decide that issue. 
For, Dave argued, the union should not have been understood to have 
attempted to do so in this case. The arbitration clause did not expressly 
mention external law-it provided only that "matters under dispute" would 
be arbitrated-and the Court should adopt a presumption against the 
arbitrability of such claims under labor agreements unless the agreement 
expressly provided for arbitration of such claims. 
The irony was marvelous. In 1960, Dave had successfully persuaded 
the Court to exempt labor agreements from the anti-arbitration doctrines 
that prevailed in the commercial sector. Thirty-eight years later, the 
pendulum having swung totally in the legal rules governing commercial 
arbitration, he was urging the Court to exempt labor agreements from one 
of the pro-arbitration doctrines that now prevailed with respect to 
commercial agreements. Dave had not changed his views. His views were 
simply nuanced. 
And, remarkably, the Court disdained the path to decision that the 
parties were focused upon, and adopted Dave's thesis once again. The 
Court held that there is a presumption against arbitration of legal issues 
under a collective bargaining agreement,33 and left to another day the 
question whether a union could, via a more explicit arbitration clause, 
deprive employees of their right to a judicial forum for resolution of claims 
arising under externallaw.34 
III. 
Dave Feller, Academic and Arbitrator 
My contacts with Dave were limited after he moved to California in 
1967, and others are far better situated to recount his successes in the thirty-
six years of his second career. But watching from afar, there were three 
aspects of that second career that were logical extensions of the first.· First, 
already recounted, were Dave's amicus briefs respecting the continued 
interpretation of Section 301. Second was Dave's scholarship respecting 
the collective bargaining agreement. His first article as law school 
professor, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,35 
External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83 (1976); 
Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 973 (1993). 
32. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27; ShearsoniAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
225-27 (1987). 
33. Wright, 525 U.S. at 77-8\. 
34. Jd. at 82. 
35. 61 CAL. L. REv. 663 (1973). 
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remains one of the seminal pieces in labor law scholarship, still cited as 
recommended reading, thirty years after its publication, in the current 
edition of the leading labor law casebook.36 Third, and in many ways the 
most remarkable, was Dave's success as one of America's leading labor 
arbitrators. Although he had been a ferocious advocate for union causes 
during his law firm career, he was sought out as arbitrator by unions and 
employers alike. There aren't many lawyers who, after spending a career 
toiling exclusively on behalf of one side in so highly-charged an arena, 
would be entrusted by the other to decide what often was high-stakes 
litigation. That Dave was so entrusted was a tribute to both his integrity 
and his brilliance. 
I'm proud, and immeasurably enriched, to have been one of Dave 
Feller's very first "students." I continued learning from him for 42 years. 
36. ARCHIBALD Cox, DEREK C. BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW 
712 n.(a) (13th ed. 2001). 
